Tuesday, November 3, 2009

118 - FDIC on Money Mules

Money mules are a vexing problem for the authorities during bouts of rising unemployment. The allure of making easy money in front of the home computer while wearing one's pyjamas is simply too strong for many to resist. Money mules are electronic money launderers who may or may not be aware of the crime they are committing.

The United States Federal Deposit Insurance Fund has issued a special alert on the subject of money mules. Given the recent spat of bank failures, one wonders where they can find the time, yet they list excellent indicators and red flags which must be incorporated into a depository institution's financial intelligence gathering processes.



SA-185-2009

October 29, 2009

TO: CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (also of interest to BSA Compliance and Security Officer)

SUBJECT: Fraudulent Work-at-Home Funds Transfer Agent Schemes

Summary: Individuals are using deposit accounts to receive unauthorized electronic funds transfers and forward funds overseas to criminals.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is warning financial institutions of an increase in schemes to recruit individuals to receive and transmit unauthorized electronic funds transfers (EFTs) from deposit accounts to individuals overseas. These funds transfer agents, often referred to as "money mules," are typically solicited on the Internet by criminals who have gained unauthorized access to the online deposit account of a business or consumer. In a typical scenario, the criminal will originate unauthorized EFTs from a victim's account to a money mule's deposit account. The money mule is then instructed to quickly withdraw the funds and wire them overseas after deducting a "commission" (commonly eight to ten percent).

Criminals target online deposit accounts at institutions where business customers can originate EFTs, such as automated clearing house (ACH) and wire transfers, over the Internet. Money mules, however, can be customers at any depository institution where EFTs can be received and funds withdrawn. In some cases, the money mule may be an unknowing accomplice in a fraud scheme. Because EFTs are often made immediately available by the receiving institution, funds may be removed and wire transferred overseas before the fraud is detected. Refer to SA-147-2009 http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/specialalert/2009/sa09147.html for more information on fraudulent EFT schemes.

Money mule schemes can take many different forms, but most involve receiving unauthorized EFTs into a deposit account and then withdrawing the funds or forwarding them on to another party via another EFT. The following are common scenarios:

  • Online job posting Web sites are used by criminals to locate individuals seeking employment with flexible work hours that can be performed from home. These work-at-home schemes often involve written employment contracts, job descriptions and procedures to legitimize the scam.
  • Advance fee scams promising large monetary rewards for acting as a financial intermediary can entice individuals to participate in this activity.
  • Mystery shopping jobs may be used that require the employee to assess the performance of money service businesses by completing EFTs and then evaluating the service using customer satisfaction forms.
  • Social networking sites may be used to recruit individuals to act as money mules. Criminals conjure up various imaginative stories to befriend and persuade individuals to receive and forward stolen funds.
  • Some hesitant or skeptical money mules have been intimidated, harassed and threatened by their criminal "employers" to process the funds transfers quickly and with secrecy.
  • The personal identifiable information provided by the money mule might later be used to commit identity theft or account takeover.
  • The following are examples of events that may indicate money mule account activity:
  • A deposit account opened with a minimal deposit soon followed by large EFT deposits.
  • Deposit customers who suddenly begin receiving and sending EFTs related to new employment, investments, business opportunities or acquaintances (especially opportunities found on the Internet).
  • A newly opened deposit account with an unusual amount of activity, such as account inquiries, or a large dollar amount or high number of incoming EFTs.
  • An account that receives incoming EFTs then shortly afterward originates outgoing wire transfers or cash withdrawals approximately eight to ten percent less than the incoming EFTs.
  • A foreign exchange student with a J-1 Visa and fraudulent passport opening a student account with a high volume of incoming/outgoing EFT activity.

Money mule activity is essentially electronic money laundering addressed by the Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations. Strong customer identification, customer due diligence, and high-risk account monitoring procedures are essential for detecting suspicious activity, including money mule accounts. Financial institutions can find additional guidance about customer identification, account monitoring, suspicious activity reporting, and identity theft red flags below:

FDIC Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies - Bank Secrecy Act

www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/FDIC_DOCs/BSA_Manual.pdf;

FFIEC Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual

www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/default.htm and

FFIEC Identity Theft Red Flags – Interagency Final Regulations and Guidelines

www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2007/fil07100.pdf

Financial institutions should act promptly when they believe fraudulent or improper activities have occurred, such as those of a money mule. Appropriate actions may include, but are not limited to, filing a Suspicious Activity Report and/or closing the deposit account in accordance with existing, board-approved account closure policies and procedures.

Cyber-fraud incidents and other fraudulent activity may be forwarded to the FDIC's Cyber-Fraud and Financial Crimes Section, 550 17th Street, N.W., Room F-4004, Washington, D.C. 20429, or transmitted electronically toalert@fdic.gov. Questions related to federal deposit insurance or consumer issues should be submitted to the FDIC using an online form that can be accessed at http://www2.fdic.gov/starsmail/index.asp.

For your reference, FDIC Special Alerts may be accessed from the FDIC's website athttp://www.fdic.gov/news/news/specialalert/2009/index.html. To automatically receive FDIC Special Alerts through e-mail, please visit www.fdic.gov/about/subscriptions/index.html.


Friday, October 30, 2009

117 - K1 Gets Killed

Bafin, the German financial regulator, sanctioned Mr. Helmut Kierner's K1 Group four times from 2001 to 2004. This past Wednesday, the authorities in Germany raided K1 Group and accused the fund-of-funds management company of fraud. According to the arrest warrant, Barclays Bank will probably lose USD220-million. Other top tier global investment banks will lose large amounts.

Hedge funds thrive on opacity. Funds-of-funds do the same. They never wish to reveal their investment strategies, even to those who front them cash for leverage or potential/actual investors. It's usually a game of "Trust us, we know what we're doing."

In today's marketplace, opacity can no longer be justified. Too many actual funds are frauds. Too many fund-of-funds either invest in frauds (as their due diligence leaves much to be desired) or are frauds investing in ghost funds.

It's a safe bet that the regulatory boom will come down on the hedge fund industry. Bureaucrats and others who most likely never enrolled in first year economics will draft or vote on legislation.

Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) was a knee-jerk response to Enron, WorldComm and other demons from the Dot Bomb craze at the turn of the century. Expect the same reaction in the coming months regarding the hedge fund industry. Sympathy could be offered, however it's drowned in the contemptuous arrogance so willingly flaunted just a short while ago.





From
October 30, 2009

Barclays faces £130m loss from ‘fraud’ at German fund

Barclays may have lost as much as $220 million (£130 million) from investments with K1 Group, the German hedge fund whose founder, Helmut Kiener, is at the centre of a fraud inquiry.

The British bank’s investment, fed into K1 between 2006 and 2009, is “mostly lost”, according to an arrest warrant for Mr Kiener. The former advertising salesman was arrested on Wednesday night on suspicion of fraud and breach of trust relating to K1, a fund of hedge funds. He was still in police custody last night after a judge extended his detention yesterday.

Mr Kiener and K1 are also being investigated by the FBI. Barclays said that it was co-operating with inquiries, but would not comment further. Sources close to the bank said that provisions will have been made for any potential losses.

Other banks believed to have lost money in K1 include JPMorgan Chase, BNP Paribas and Société Générale.

Mr Kiener has been in the spotlight since prosecutors in Würzburg, Bavaria, said on Wednesday that they were investigating his activities. Police removed files after searching his home and office in Aschaffenburg. Mr Kiener’s lawyers said yesterday that no one was available for comment.

German prosecutors said that one other person was being investigated in the inquiry, but declined to say whom.

Mr Kiener, who is relatively unknown among professional investors, turned to fund management after selling advertising in telephone directories.

K1 Group’s website described him as a psychologist and inventor of the “K1 fund allocation system”. The business had almost $1 billion under management, Army Yan, a K1 manager in Hong Kong, told Hedgeweek, an industry newsletter, in February.

Bafin, the German financial regulator, censured Mr Kiener four times between 2001 and 2004. Two censures were overturned on appeal.

The criminal inquiry into K1 comes as European and American regulators, encouraged by Germany, plan new restrictions on the hedge fund industry.This month, Raj Rajaratnam, the founder of Galleon, the US hedge fund, was charged with insider trading in the biggest case of its kind for more than a decade. He denies all allegations.

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Thursday, October 29, 2009

116 - IT Department Nightmare

It would appear that Adeniyi Adeyemi, 27, of Brooklyn, New York, is a bank's worst Information Technology Department nightmare. It is alleged that he stole the identities of 150 employees of the Bank of New York Mellon and pilfered the accounts of various charities and non-profit organisations.

It is alleged he laundered the profits through various brokerage accounts and money orders in the names of the stolen identities. There is evidence to suggest that his illegal activity was camouflaged through internet access to unprotected or cracked WiFi networks accessible in his apartment building.

In a delightful twist of fate, one of the charities allegedly defrauded by Mr. Adeyemi is the International Association of Women Judges. His arraignment on the charges in State Supreme Court was before Justice Carol Berkman.

It is unlikely she will be impressed with the man placed before her.




DISTRICT ATTORNEY - NEW YORK COUNTY

NEWS RELEASE
October 28, 2009

Contact: Alicia Maxey Greene
212-335-9400

Manhattan District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau announced today a 149-count indictment of a computer technician for stealing the identities of more than 150 employees of the Bank of New York Mellon and using these identities to orchestrate more than $1.1 million in thefts against charities and non-profits, among other institutions.

The defendant ADENIYI ADEYEMI, 27, of Brooklyn, has been indicted on charges of grand larceny, identity theft, money laundering, scheme to defraud, computer tampering, and unlawful possession of personal identification information. The crimes charged in the indictment occurred between November 1, 2001 and April 30, 2009.

The investigation leading to today’s indictment revealed that ADEYEMI was employed as a computer technician at the headquarters of the Bank of New York at 1 Wall Street and other Bank of New York locations in Manhattan. In the course of his tenure at Bank of New York, ADEYEMI stole the personal identifying information of dozens of Bank of New York employees, mainly in the Information Technology Department, where he was assigned. In the years that followed, ADEYEMI used the employees’ personal identifiers to open over 30 bank and brokerage accounts in their identities with several financial institutions, including E*Trade, Fidelity, Citi, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual. These accounts served as dummy accounts for the purpose of receiving stolen funds. ADEYEMI then stole money from the bank accounts of charities and non-profit organizations and funneled it into the dummy accounts, later withdrawing the stolen funds or transferring them to a second layer of dummy accounts. In the interests of facilitating donations, many charities readily disseminate their banking details on the Internet, making them easy prey for unauthorized withdrawals by identity thieves, particularly those with computer expertise such as ADEYEMI. Most of ADEYEMI’s theft was perpetrated over the Internet.

For example, in July 2006, ADEYEMI opened a dummy account with E*Trade, an online brokerage, in the name of a Bank of New York employee from the Information Technology Department. Over the course of the ensuing two months, ADEYEMI transferred money online from the bank account of Goodwill Industries of Greater New York and Northern New Jersey into the dummy account. By the time the fraud was uncovered, ADEYEMI had stolen $120,000 from Goodwill Industries. ADEYEMI spent nearly $70,000 of that total on money orders from the United States Postal Service (USPS), and withdrew the remainder in cash or transferred it to other dummy accounts. Other victimized organizations include Iris Ministries, the Kalgidhar Trust, the Sudanese American Community Development Organization, Ravi Zacharias International Ministries, AFK Foundation, the American Community School at Beirut, the Jacksonville Humane Society, American Friends of Birdlife International, the International Association of Women Judges, the Space Generation Advisory Council, and the American Association for Clinical Chemistry.

ADEYEMI also stole from the Bank of New York employees themselves. Exploiting his theft of their personal identification information, ADEYEMI changed the contact information associated with the employees’ online banking profiles, took control of their online banking capabilities, and wired money from the employees’ personal bank accounts to dummy accounts he had established. To avoid scrutiny, ADEYEMI structured all such wire transfers to be just under $10,000, the threshold at which all financial institutions must report transactions to the United States Treasury. ADEYEMI stole more than $128,000 by compromising Bank of New York employees’ online banking profiles in this manner. Among other purchases, ADEYEMI used these stolen proceeds to buy additional USPS money orders. All told, ADEYEMI purchased more than $100,000 in USPS money orders using stolen funds. ADEYEMI redeemed these money orders, among other things, to pay personal expenses such as rent on his apartment and his credit card bills. ADEYEMI also redeemed USPS money orders to ship substantial volumes of goods overseas, primarily to Nigeria.

ADEYEMI came under surveillance by the New York/New Jersey Electronic Crimes Task Force of the United States Secret Service when suspicious Internet activity traced back to wireless Internet connections in ADEYEMI’s apartment building, and mail connected to the fraud was delivered to the various apartments within the building. In executing a court-authorized search warrant of ADEYEMI’s apartment on April 30, 2009, investigators found dozens of Bank of New York employees’ credit reports on his computer, along with many other documents containing personal identifying information of more than 150 Bank of New York employees. In a storage locker ADEYEMI rented, the investigative team found notebooks containing hundreds of names, social security numbers, account numbers, and other personal data, along with numerous credit cards in Bank of New York employees’ names. Investigators also recovered $30,000 in cash from ADEYEMI’s apartment. ADEYEMI was arrested in the course of the search warrant execution, and has remained in custody since.

ADEYEMI has been indicted on one count of Grand Larceny in the First Degree, 138 counts of counts of Identity Theft in the First Degree, one count of Money Laundering in the First Degree, one count of Computer Tampering in the First Degree, two counts of Money Laundering in the Second Degree, three counts of Grand Larceny in the Second Degree, two counts of Scheme to Defraud in the First Degree, and one count of Unlawful Possession of Personal Identification Information in the Second Degree.

Grand Larceny in the First Degree and Money Laundering in the First Degree are class B felonies which are punishable by up to 25 years in prison. Computer Tampering in the First Degree, Money Laundering in the Second Degree, and Grand Larceny in the Second Degree are class C felonies which are punishable by up to 15 years in prison. Identity Theft in the First Degree is a class D felony which is punishable by up to 7 years in prison. Scheme to Defraud in the First Degree and Unlawful Possession of Personal Identification Information in the Second Degree are class E felonies which are punishable by up to 4 years in prison.

The investigation is continuing. ADEYEMI will be arraigned today in State Supreme Court before Justice Carol Berkman, Part 71.

Mr. Morgenthau thanked the Bank of New York Mellon, particularly Vice President for Corporate Security George Sulfaro, for the bank’s assistance in uncovering the scope and depth of the data breach; and the New York/New Jersey Electronic Crimes Task Force (ECTF) of the United States Secret Service, particularly Special Agent Prasanth Kurian, lead investigator on the case, and Special Agent Robert Novy, supervisor of the ECTF.

Mr. Morgenthau also thanked investigators from the following institutions: JPMorgan Chase Bank, E*Trade, Fidelity Investments, Bank of America, Wachovia, the New York Police Department, and the United States Postal Inspection Service.

Assistant District Attorney Ehren Reynolds is handling the prosecution of the case and presented it to the Grand Jury, under the supervision of Assistant District Attorney Antonia Merzon, Chief of the Identity Theft Unit. Investigative Analysts Lindsay Kosan and Michelle Ragusa assisted in the investigation, and Senior Forensic Examiner Richard Brittson also assisted. The District Attorney’s Investigation Bureau assisted in the investigation, under the supervision of Chief Joseph Pennisi.


Wednesday, October 28, 2009

115 - Don't just worry about regulators

The former CEO of Family Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, Illinois, would be paying a price for willingly turning a blind eye towards deposits of illicit drug cash (related to crystal methamphetamine) being dumped into his bank.

Not filing Currency Transaction Reports has landed them in hot water with the United States District Attorney for Northern Illinois. According to press reports, the scheme was uncovered thanks to an undercover narcotics investigation.

Undercover law enforcement can be just as dangerous as banking regulators.


114 - 1980s Wall Street - The Sequel

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Integrated Market Enforcement Team (IMET), the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), FINRA, IIROC and the Manhattan DA have all teamed up to expose the insider trading of Stanko Joseph Grmovsek.

Gromovsek and his old law school pal Gil Cornblum generated millions from insider trading before the announcement of mergers or acquisitions generally in Canada. Cornblum would communicate the particulars of impending corporate transactions and Grmovsek would engage onshore and offshore entities to undertake profitable speculative positions in the associated securities. The two of them would split the loot.

It is no exaggeration to state that the methods used by both Grmovsek and Cornblum come right out of the techniques employed by Dennis Levine, Ivan Boesky and other investment banking hoodlums of the 1980s. It would appear that both men took copious notes from Dennis Levine's "Inside Out" autobiography, fantastically believing that such archaic methods would succeed in the high-tech environment of 1996-2008, the time period of their shenanigans.

The chief weapon of sea pirates, however, was their capacity to astonish. Nobody else could believe, until it was too late, how heartless and greedy they were.

- Kurt Vonnegut (1922 - 2007), Breakfast of Champions


113 - Intoxication of Sundanese Oil

Robert J. Cabelly, 61, of Washington D.C. is a former United States State Department employee who appears to have put his previous work experience to use in the private sector by facilitating transactions for the Republic of Sudan, a country considered by the United States as a terrorist haven.

It would appear that Cabelly understood the value of Sudanese oil in parching the thirst of (presumably non-American) oil companies.

Would Cabelly have been classified as a politically-exposed person? Probably not. Would the Cook Islands' financial intelligence unit have reported him? Perhaps, if he had been sloppy with the payments provided by the "foreign oil company". The Cook Islands Financial Intelligence Unit may have reported him to FinCEN, leading into an investigation of Cabelly's actual business dealings as oppose to the tripe he allegedly passed on to the State Department.



Jerome K. Jerome (1859 - 1927)




Tuesday, October 27, 2009

112 - Lawyers Accepting Dirty Money? Cannot be!

The debate grows in the United States whether lawyers can accept "dirty money" from their clients in order to secure accurate legal representation. Or are the lawyers money laundering for their clients?

The legal gymnastics are far from over. Below is the latest shot across the Bar bows. Given the fact that turkeys will never vote for Christmas, is there any doubt on what ruling will inevitably prevail?